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A MISAPPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO
RENT CONTROL: FISHER v. CITY OF BERKELEY
In Fisher v. City of Berkeley, the California Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court upheld municipal rent control
under the Sherman Act. This Comment points out several flaws in
the Fisher analysis. Nonetheless, while acknowledging the eco-
nomic problems associated with rent control, this Comment con-
cludes that municipal rent control ordinances are clearly outside
the scope of Sherman Act antitrust analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Rent control elicits intense negative reaction among economists.
Economists generally agree that rent controls have virtually no re-
deeming features. While some tenants may benefit, tfie general pub-
lic loses due to a misallocation of scarce resources. Landlords tend to
devote fewer resources to construction of new rental housing and to
maintenance of the already existing housing stock. The housing
shortage is thereby worsened, and existing units may deteriorate.
Despite such ill effects, tenants continue to vote for local rent control
ordinances.' Landlords continue to fight what appears to be a losing
rent control battle; over 200 United States cities are now governed
by rent control ordinances. 2 Recently, a local ordinance was attacked
1. Are renters who vote for rent control simply shortsighted and ill-informed?
I think there is a better explanation. Although rent control is bad for renters
taken as a whole, it is good for the particular subgroup of tenants that votes on
the measure and bad for the subgroup of tenants that does not vote. Rent con-
trol benefits those of the "tenant class" who are now tenants, at the expense of
those that will become tenants later. These include nonresidents, those who are
too young to establish independent households, and those who are currently
homeowners and plan to become tenants.
Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences,
69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 555 (1984).
2. Id. at 527.
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on the basis that the control unreasonably restrained trade under the
Sherman Act.3
This Comment will discuss the economic problems associated with
rent control. Further, the Comment will analyze the viability and
desirability of a Sherman Act attack on local rent control ordi-
nances. This Comment concludes that it is inappropriate to invali-
date rent controls based on the Sherman Act. To give the reader a
clear overview of the economic and antitrust implications of local
rent controls, this Comment will discuss the following: the economics
of rent control; municipal antitrust liability as it relates to rent con-
trol; an analysis of the recent Fisher v. City of Berkeley" decision;
and the applicability of the Sherman Act to nonproprietary" local
government functions such as the enforcement of rent controls.
THE ECONOMICS OF RENT CONTROL
The theoretical objections to rent control may be inferred from the
basic supply and demand model of a competitive market.' In a com-
3. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr.
682 (1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
4. Id.
5. See infra note 29.
6. The assumptions underlying the model for pure competition are as follows: (a)each landlord's goal is to maximize profits; (b) all rental units are homogeneous; (c) noindividual landlord or tenant can significantly affect the price of the rental; (d) there are
no artificial price restraints; and (e) resources are perfectly mobile.
Some economists may modify the analysis to account for housing submarkets and
housing which is not totally substitutable.
Professor Rabin claims, however, that the rental housing market is intensely competi-tive as more than half of all rentals are buildings of less than five units, ownership ofsuch units is diffuse, few landlords demonstrate any significant degree of monopolypower, and landlords compete with ownership units and mobile homes as well as other
rental units. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 578-79 (1984). But see Weitzman, Economicsand Rent Regulation: A Call For a New Perspective, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.










Xl Xe X2 Qantity or
Rental Homaing
The model (see Figure 1) assumes a relatively inelastic supply curve (SI) in the short
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petitive market without price restraints, market forces determine the
equilibrium price. At the equilibrium price there are no shortages or
surpluses.7 On the other hand, where a price ceiling is engaged and
set below the equilibrium price a shortage of rental units will result.
The supply of housing adjusts in the long run.8 If economic prof-
its9 are made, existing and new landlords will have the incentive to
provide more rental housing, either by construction or rehabilitation.
The supply will increase until all excess profits are eliminated and
each landlord is earning a normal rate of return.10 If a landlord is
earning less than a normal rate of return, he will either cut costs and
continue in the rental business, or he will leave the market. To cut
costs, landlords may invest fewer or no resources into maintenance.
The inevitable result is deterioration of existing rental units. Studies
suggest that post-World War II rent controls may have had this ef-
fect on New York City's housing stock." Landlords may also cut
run as landlords will be largely unresponsive to changes in price. The "short run" is an
indefinite period of time during which at least some costs must be fixed. A landlord, for
example, could not respond to changes in price by either disposing of or acquiring addi-
tional amounts of rental property. Either one of these will take time. See generally R.
LEFTWICH & R. ECKERT, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION (1982). The
demand curve (DI) is downward sloping representing the inverse relationship between
the price and quantity of rentals. Because rental housing is a normal good, renters will
demand more as the price drops and less as the price increases. In effect, the demand
curve represents the tenants' willingness to pay. The demand for a good is the various
quantities of the good per unit of time that consumers will take at all possible alternative
prices, other things being held constant. The quantity demanded is affected by the price
of the good, corsumer tastes and preferences, the number of consumers, consumer in-
come, the price of related goods, thL range or number of goods available, and consumer
expectations regarding future prices of the good. Id. at 42-43.
7. If a landlord were to set price at P1, renters would only demand Xl and a
surplus of rental units would exist equal to the distance between Xl and Xe. Because the
market is competitive, no landlord can increase price and still attract tenants, as tenants
will not be willing to pay P1. If a landlord were to charge P2, renters would demand X2
rentals and, because X2 is greater than the supply, a shortage of rental housing would
exist equal to the distance between Xe and X2. See Figure 1.
8. The "long run" is the period when all costs are variable.
9. Economic profits are a pure surplus or excess of total receipts over all costs of
production.
10. A normal rate of return is the rate of return necessary to attract funds into an
industry. After subtracting from revenues the cost of business, the normal rate of return
is what is left over to cover the opportunity cost of the owner's investment. If a business
earns more than a normal rate of return, new businesses will be attracted into the indus-
try. If less than a normal rate is earned, then businesses will exit the industry.
11. See, e.g., C. RAPKIN, THE PRIVATE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET IN NEW YORK
CITY (1966); G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES. HOUSING AND ECONOMIC REALITY: NEW
YORK CITY (1976). A study of the total number of occupied rentals in New York City
shows that rental units declined from 2,077,000 units in 1965 to 1,999,000 in 1975, a
3.8% loss. According to Sternlieb & Hughes, the situation is at best a stagnating one.
Between 1960 and 1975 the overall rental housing supply was relatively stable, but there
costs by evading local property taxes, thereby decreasing the local
tax base.
As the population grows, demand for rental housing grows. Rent
controls tend to reduce the supply of rental housing in proportion to
the population in several ways. Private investment is discouraged.
Landlords may convert rent controlled units to condominiums to
avoid controls. 12 Rent controlled units may even be abandoned.
Short run rental price reductions give way to long run rental price
increases.
Little empirical evidence exists as to the effects of rent control on
the nation's distribution of income."3 It is clear, however, that rent
controls have serious effects on the allocation of resources. Resources
are diverted from their most highly valued uses. The most detrimen-
tal effect is that builders and lenders refuse to invest in new con-
struction.1 4 Existing evidence indicates no beneficial long-run effects.
STATE ACTION IMMUNITY, PREEMPTION AND MUNICIPAL
ANTITRUST LIABILITY
The Sherman Antitrust Act 5 prohibits monopolization and unrea-
sonable restraints"6 of trade.1 7 States acting anticompetitively gener-
were significant shifts between controlled and noncontrolled units. There were 1,476,000
controlled units in 1960 and only 642,000 in 1975. Noncontrolled units shifted from
362,000 in 1960 to 1,174,000 in 1975.
12. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 535.
13. See Muth, Redistribution of Income Through Regulation in Housing, 32 EM-
ORY L.J. 691 (1983) (rent controls probably have little or no impact on the distribution
of income). But see Siegan, Commentary on Redistribution of Income Through Regula-
tion in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 721, 722-23 (1983) (rent controls probably have an
adverse impact on production significant enough to be reflected in the national distribu-
tion of income).
14. See Siegan, supra note 13, at 723 (As Chair of the Regulations Committee of
the President's Commission on Housing, Professor Siegan stated that builders and lend-
ers "virtually swore" to the Commission "that they would never invest in rental housing
construction in a community subject to rent controls, even if those controls did not apply
to newly constructed housing.").
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
16. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
17. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any con-
tract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other per-
son, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize or attempts to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
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ally are immune from the federal antitrust laws under the state ac-
tion, or Parker, doctrine. 8 In Parker v. Brown,'
9 an agricultural
marketing program enacted by the State of California was chal-
lenged under the Sherman Act. The program restricted competition
among growers and maintained prices in the distribution of the
growers' commodities to packers.
2 0 Based on principles of state sov-
ereignty and federalism, Parker held that states are immune as
"nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history...
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature.' Immunity did
not extend to state or municipal participation in private agreements
or combinations with others for the purpose of restraining 
trade.22
Thirty-five years passed before the United States Supreme Court
decided whether Parker immunity would automatically protect local
governments from the antitrust laws. In City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co.,23 two Louisiana cities that owned and oper-
ated electric utility systems pursuant to Louisiana law sued a private
power company alleging antitrust violations. The private company
then counterclaimed, claiming that it was the municipalities that
were in violation of federal antitrust law. The Court held that "the
Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
18. For extensive coverage of the evolution of the state action doctrine, see Areeda,
Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARv. L. REV. 435 (1981);
Hovencamp & Mankerron, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32
UCLA L. REv. 719 (1985); Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust
Laws: Litigation Strategies, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 395 (1983).
For a concise and current history of the Parker doctrine and its relationship to the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see Comment, Municipal and Private Petitioner Immunity
from Antitrust Liability: A Declaration of Independence to Preserve the Parker and No-
err-Pennington Doctrines, 65 NEB. L. REV. 330 (1986); see also Wiley, A Capture The-
ory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1986). See infra notes 22, 26, & 34.
19. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
20. Id. at 346.
21. Id. at 350-51.
22. Id. at 351-52. For development of the Parker doctrine between 1975 and 1977,
see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (anticompetitive activities must
be "compelled" by the state acting as a sovereign to be immune from antitrust scrutiny);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (active state policy required in addi-
tion to compulsion for state action immunity); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(antitrust immunity where restraint compelled by state, actively supervised by the state,
and state policy is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed); see infra notes 26, 34.
23. 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978).
an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivi-
sions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service.""' For Parker immunity, the Court re-
quired a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state pol-
icy.25 The anticompetitive conduct, however, need only be contem-
plated by the state and not the subject of express state
authorization.2" A plurality of the Court based its conclusion on
principles of federalism. The crux of the opinion was the statement
that cities are not sovereign in the same way as states.27
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger focused on the na-
ture of the challenged activity and the status of the adversary par-
ties.28 The Burger opinion drew a distinction between cities involved
in proprietary activities and those involved in traditional activities. 29
The concurrence implied that municipalities engaged in nonproprie-
tary functions should be exempt from antitrust laws.
Justice Stewart, dissenting, would have found the cities immune.
Justice Stewart argued that Parker immunity was premised on the
distinction between governmental and private action. Parker did not
distinguish between the actions of a state legislature and other levels
of the government.30
After Lafayette, it was believed that a "home rule" municipality,
which enjoyed a broad grant of power from the state to act autono-
mously, would fall within the state action doctrine.31 However, in
Community Communications Corp. v. City of Boulder,3 2 the Court
24. Id. at 413.
25. Id. at 410.
26. Id. at 415. For subsequent refinement of the Parker doctrine between 1978 and1980, see New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (applyingboth the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" and "active state supervision"
tests); see also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (explicitly adopted the two-prong "active state supervision" and"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" test for cases involving state regulation
of private parties); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105
S. Ct. 1721, 1727 (1985) (Parker immunity available to state regulated private parties iftwo-part Midcal test satisfied). See supra note 22; see infra note 34.
27. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412.
28. Id. at 418-20 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
29. The distinction between proprietary and nonproprietary municipal action is notalways clear. If the city performs services for which fees are charged, then the servicelooks much like private enterprise and is usually considered proprietary. Other activities.are usually considered governmental in the sense that they involve the kind of powerexpected of government. . . ." W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984).
Perhaps a distinction could be made on the basis of whether the interests of the munic-
ipality coincide with the interests of the public at large.
30. Id. at 426-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. Municipalities empowered by the state to act autonomously in local mattersare home rule municipalities. The grant of power may result from the state constitution
or statute.
32. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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held that home rule municipalities are not exempt from the antitrust
laws.13 "[TIhe requirement of clear articulation of alternative ex-
pression is not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neu-
trality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticompeti-
tive."3 4  Hence, after Boulder, local governments engaged in
anticompetitive and nonproprietary practices may be liable for an
antitrust violation.3 5
For cases filed before the passage of the Local Government Anti-
trust Act of 1984,6 the Court's threshold analysis could determine
the extent of municipal liability, and the results vary. Application of
preemption analysis to a local rent control ordinance will result in its
invalidation if it conflicts with the Sherman Act.
37 However, thresh-
old application of the state action immunity doctrine to the same
ordinance may result in a violation of the Sherman Act with money
damages as the remedy. A violation will result if the ordinance does
not constitute action of the state itself or arise from a "clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy. Even when
money damages are not sought,38 the distinction may be important.
33. For more detail on the Boulder decision, see Note, Home Rule and the Sher-
man Act After Boulder: Cities Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 259 (1983).
34. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55 (emphasis in original). Boulder did not determine
whether the two-prong Midcal test must be met by cities seeking protection under the
Parker doctrine. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985), resolved this
issue. As to municipalities, the court held that the "active state supervision" requirement
did not apply to municipal conduct but the conduct must be pursuant to clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy. The conduct, however, need not be ex-
pressly mentioned so long as it is a "foreseeable result" of the "broad authority to regu-
late" conferred by the state. Id. at 42. The requirement in Goldfarb and Cantor that the
state "compel" the anticompetitive conduct was rejected in Town of Hallie (although
explicit compulsion language is evidence of state policy). Id. at 4. See supra notes 22, 26;
see also Comment, supra note 18.
35. Although a conflict between municipal regulation and the Sherman Act could
be alleged before Boulder pursuant to Lafayette, Lafayette involved proprietary conduct.
Hence, nonproprietary conduct was not scrutinized in a real sense until Boulder.
36. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1984)).
37. Preemption analysis is correctly applied when the federal antitrust laws conflict
with state or local regulation. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982);
see also infra note 39.
38. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for treble damages: "Any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws ... shall recover threefold damages by him sustained, and the cost of reason-
able attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981).
After Boulder, the House Judiciary Committee identified the treble damages remedy
as a major incentive underlying civil suits against local governments. In response, Presi-
dent Reagan signed the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. The Act prohibits the
recovery of damages under the Clayton Act against local governments. Hence, any suit
filed after Oct. 24, 1984 cannot claim money damages. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36.
A court might prefer one approach over another to reach a desired
outcome. For example, if there is little or no support for a finding
that municipal action was pursuant to the state action standard, but
the court does not want to find a violation, it may apply preemption
analysis.39 Since Boulder, lawsuits have targeted various local gov-
ernment functions, such as utility regulation,4 0 zoning,41 airport
42 43 44transportation, garbage collection,43  sewer services, and rent
control.4
5
Fisher v. City of Berkeley"" is the first Supreme Court case to
apply section 1 of the Sherman Act to local rent controls. While the
Fisher appeal was pending, Boulder was decided. It was only then
that the antitrust issue was raised by amicus curiae.47 The California
Supreme Court gave considerable attention to the antitrust issue and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to deter-
mine the antitrust issue. The impetus behind the Fisher antitrust is-
sue was Boulder. Apparently, both courts wanted to dispel the belief
39. Judicial and scholarly debate exists as to the correct approach. See Boulder,
455 U.S. at 68-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
It is beyond this Comment's scope to consider in depth all of the philosophies andramifications of applying preemption analysis. For scholarly debate see Cirace, An Eco-nomic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 TEx. L. REv. 481,486-90 (1982); Note, Preemption or Exemption - What is the Proper Test for HomeRule Antitrust Immunity?: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 31 DEPAUL L. REv. 819 (1982); Conant, The Supremacy Clause and State Economic Con-
trols: The Antitrust Maze, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 255 (1983).40. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Preferred Communica-
tions, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
41. Westborough Mail, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason
City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
42. See generally Executive Town & Country Serv., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 789F.2d 1523 (11 th Cir. 1986); Independent Taxicab Drivers' Employees v. Greater Hous-ton Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1985); Lorrie's Travel & Tours v. SFO
Airporter, Inc., 753 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1985).
43. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984); Cen-tral Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419(8th Cir. 1983); Hume v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1982); Savage v.Waste Management, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1505 (D.S.C. 1985); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Mu-nicipality of Monroeville, 617 F. Supp. 820 (D. Pa. 1986); Ideal Waste Sys., Inc. v.Provo City Corp., 605 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1985); Jefferson Disposal Co., Inc. v.Parish of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125 (D. La. 1985); Seay Bros., Inc. v. City of Albu-
querque, 601 F. Supp. 1518 (D.N.M. 1985).
44. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983),
affid, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
45. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1984), affid, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
46. Id.
47. Jon Smock, representing the California Apartment Association, argued thatthe rent control ordinance did not fall within the state action exemption as California didnot grant the City of Berkeley the express power to displace competition through rentcontrol. He also argued that the rent ceilings constituted illegal price fixing under a per
se standard of antitrust liability.
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that antitrust damages would be readily available.
8
It is noteworthy that although the Boulder decision had initially
prompted the Fisher antitrust issue,49 the California Supreme Court
held that the Boulder state action issue was not reached, and the
United States Supreme Court agreed. The proper threshold inquiry,
according to both courts, was whether the rent control ordinance
conflicted with the Sherman Act such that it would be invalidated.
The choice of preemption analysis displayed a judicial unwilling-
ness to find a violation of the Sherman Act. Using the state action
immunity doctrine to exempt the ordinance from Sherman Act scru-
tiny would have been strained because the ordinance was not passed
pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state
policy nor did it constitute municipal action of the state itself. A
thorough examination of the Fisher case is necessary to obtain a full
understanding of the implications for local governments engaging in
rent controls.
THE Fisher DECISION
A group of landlords owning property in the City of Berkeley
sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of
the "Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance"
(Ordinance).50 The Ordinance affects 23,000 out of 27,000 Berkeley
rental units. Government owned units are excluded from the con-
trols. Section 10 of the Ordinance fixes base rent ceilings. Landlords
may not exceed those ceilings except as permitted by the Rent Stabi-
lization Board. The Board retains authority to adopt a general
formula which allows adjustments for utility and tax increases. A
landlord, dissatisfied with the general increase may petition the
Board for individual adjustment. The Board may not deny a rent
increase needed to allow a landlord a "fair return on investment."
51
48. For commentary on the wave of fear that hit municipalities after Boulder, see
Goodrich, The Limits of Municipal Power, 4 CAL. LAW., March 1986, at 26; Spiegel,
Local Governments and the Terror of Antitrust, 69 A.B.A.J. 163 (1983). This issue is
now moot due to the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. See supra note 38.
49. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 654 n.3, 693 P.2d at 271 n.3, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 692
n.3.
50. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 5261 (June 3, 1980).
51. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 653, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691 ("[T]he
Board must consider many nonexclusive factors, including a landlord's individual costs,
but in no event may it deny a rent increase needed to allow a landlord a 'fair return on
investment.' ").
The California Supreme Court Opinion
The antitrust issue in Fisher revolved around the possible conflict
between the Ordinance and the Sherman Act. The court used a pre-
emption analysis based on the Constitution's supremacy clause 2
The immunity issue was never reached since no conflict was found.
The court clarified that Parker was a preemption case characterized
by Boulder and Lafayette as establishing a state action exemption
from the antitrust laws, and that "[u]nlike Parker, both of these
later cases were private antitrust suits for damages, not invalidation
of a regulation. 5 Read literally, the court seemed to indicate that
the test applied would depend on the remedy sought. It is more
likely, however, that the court was alerting potential plaintiffs that
damages would not be awarded in cases involving nonproprietary
functions like rent control.5 4 The Fisher opinion exhibited a great
unwillingness to use the Sherman Act to invalidate rent controls. An
examination of the conflict issue is important.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract, combina-
tion. . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States . . .is . . .declared to be illegal."' 5  Section 2 of the
Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several States
• ..shall be deemed guilty of a felony."'56
The landlords claimed that the Ordinance mandating rental hous-
ing rates constituted illegal price fixing under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. In order to find a facial conflict between the Ordinance
and the Sherman Act, the court noted that the "plaintiff must estab-
lish as a matter of law (a) that two or more 'persons' acted in con-
cert, (b) that the activities complained of affect interstate commerce,
and (c) that the action constitutes an unreasonable restraint on com-
merce. '57 And the court could invalidate the Ordinance only when it"mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a viola-
tion of the antitrust law in all cases, or if it places irresistible pres-
sure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to com-
ply with the statute."58
The court focused on traditional antitrust liability rules in deter-
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see supra notes 37 & 39.
53. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 660 n.8, 693 P.2d at 275 n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 696
n.8.
54. See supra note 38.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
56. Id. § 2.
57. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 662, 693 P.2d at 276, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
58. Id. at 662, 693 P.2d at 277, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 698; Rice v. Norman Williams
Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).
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mining the existence of a conflict. Certain types of restraints are
classified as illegal "per se." Any combination formed "for the pur-
pose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity"
59 is illegal per se under the
Sherman Act.60 A "rule of reason" approach applies to the majority
of nonprice restraints."' These nonprice restraints are analyzed in
light of their economic effects on market conditions.
62
If the landlords had voluntarily joined together to fix rental prices,
there is no doubt that the combination would constitute a per se vio-
lation of section 1. The issue then is whether a local government
should be deemed guilty of a per se violation because its rent control
ordinance has the same effect as a clearly illegal private
combination.
63
The California Supreme Court noted that the traditional antitrust
rules regulated private business and were premised on the assump-
tion that rational business competitors were profit maximizers. Mu-
nicipal decisions to replace competition with rent control measures
were based instead on public health, safety and welfare
considerations.
The court concluded that per se" or rule of reason
6 5 analyses were
inapplicable to municipalities. The court sought a test "sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the interest of local government in promot-
ing public health, safety and welfare programs or regulations" and,
59. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 666, 693 P.2d at 279, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (quoting
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)).
60. There are generally five types of restraints that fall within the per se rule: (1)
horizontal price fixing; (2) vertical price maintenance; (3) group boycotts; (4) tying ar-
rangements; and (5) horizontal market division. Other restraints are analyzed under a
rule of reason. See generally 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 8.2, 8.3
(1980).
61. See id.
62. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
63. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 714, 693 P.2d at 316, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
64. The two principal justifications for a per se rule are economic reliability and
ease of administration. Fisher, Cal. 3d at 668-71, 693 P.2d at 281-84, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
702-04.
65. The rule of reason approach considers the effects of the conduct on competi-
tion. If applied, most municipal action would violate the law. Id. at 671-73, 693 P.2d at
284-85, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 705-06.
at the same time, one that was "not toothless."66 The court turned to
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution67 for guid-
ance, concluding:
[I]f a municipal regulation has a proper local purpose, is rationally relatedto the municipality's legitimate exercise of its police power, and operates inan even handed manner, it must be upheld against a claim that it conflictswith section 1 of the Sherman Act unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the
city's purposes could be achieved as effectively by means that would have a
less intrusive impact on federal antitrust policies.08
Based on Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,6 the court determined that
the regulation was clearly supported by a legitimate purpose and was
rationally related to the municipality's legitimate exercise of its po-
lice power. Finally, the plaintiffs failed to suggest alternatives that
would have had a less intrusive impact.7 0 Based on the new test, no
conflict was found between section 1 and the Ordinance.
The section 2 monopolization offense requires: (1) possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the wilful acquisi-
tion of that power.71 The court refused to apply this traditional test
and found no section 2 conflict. The court did state, however, that
the plaintiff would likely have a meritorious claim if the traditional
test were applied.72
Justice Lucas, in a strong dissent, 3 stated that the Ordinance was
per se illegal because it fixed rents and the Constitution's supremacy
clause mandated that the Ordinance be declared a nullity. Justice
Lucas argued that the Ordinance failed the court's own test since
less intrusive alternatives to rent control did exist. He pointed to rent
subsidies, public housing projects, and negotiated purchase or
condemnation.
More important, Justice Lucas stated that "[t]o allow a local gov-
ernment entity to excuse a price fixing scheme on the basis of as-
serted public health, safety or welfare considerations would enmesh
the courts in an impossible task of weighing the 'apples' of social
welfare with the 'oranges' of antitrust policy."174 For this reason he
would have invalidated the ordinance.
The same reasoning justifies the opposite view. The application of
Sherman Act principles to municipal rent controls is inappropriate
66. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 674, 693 P.2d at 285, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
67. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 675, 693 P.2d at 286-87, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
69. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
70. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 678, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709.71. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).72. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 678, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709.73. Id. at 713-19, 693 P.2d at 315-18, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 735-39 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 717, 693 P.2d at 317, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (Lucas, J., dissenting)(quoting Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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since procompetitive antitrust policy and social welfare are not com-
parable. As Justice Rehnquist stated in Boulder, "[t]he Sherman
Act should not be deemed to authorize federal courts to substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bod-
ies . . . 5
The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California deci-
sion, finding no actionable conflict. It was affirmed, however, on dif-
ferent grounds than the case below.76 The traditional rules proved
adequate to resolve the issue. A voluntary landlord combination to
fix rents would clearly have been illegal per se. The court found in-
stead that the municipality had unilaterally imposed the restraint on
the landlords. "A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does
not become concerted action within the meaning of the [Sherman
Act] simply because it has a coercive effect upon parties who must
obey the law."
77
Not all restraints imposed upon private actors by local government
would necessarily constitute unilateral action. Restraints which grant
private actors "a degree of private regulatory power" would be con-
sidered "hybrid" and could be attacked under section 1. Such "hy-
brid" restraints differ from unilateral ones because the power to en-
force the provision is given to the interested private parties.78
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell found the preemption in-
quiry unnecessarily complicated. Using the Boulder and Lafayette
state action exemption analysis, he found California expressly dele-
gated to the city of Berkeley regulatory power that foreseeably
would lead to anticompetitive effects. On that basis, Justice Powell
would have declared the Ordinance valid.
70
Justice Brennan, dissenting,80 rejected the majority's unilateral re-
straint theory. Justice Brennan, like Justice Lucas below, would have
75. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
76. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1984), a ffd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
77. Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1049-50. It is interesting to note the shift in attention to
the "concerted action" issue. In the lower courts, Fisher was strictly a rent control case.
The focus of the case at the California Supreme Court was the application of antitrust
rules of liability. Once before the United States Supreme Court, the case was no longer
about rent control or liability rules but, instead, it became a case about combination.
78. Id. at 1050.
79. Id. at 1052 (Powell, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 1053 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
found a per se section 1 conflict because the Ordinance mandated
price-fixing. According to Justice Brennan, "concerted action ...
[is not] a prerequisite to a finding of preemption." 8' Arguably, the
"functional 'combination'" between the city and its officials and the
landlords would satisfy the requirement. 82 Justice Brennan inter-
preted the majority's decision as follows: a municipality's authority
to protect the public welfare should not be constrained by the Sher-
man Act despite Boulder and Lafayette. 3
THE IMPLICATIONS OF Fisher FOR RENT CONTROL CHALLENGES
PREMISED ON THE SHERMAN ACT
The California and United States Supreme Courts were unwilling
to use the Sherman Act to invalidate the Berkeley Ordinance. On
the surface, neither opinion appears to foreclose future Sherman Act
attacks. However, closer analysis reveals otherwise.
Although the California Supreme Court sidestepped settled anti-
trust precedent to avoid the invalidation, a plaintiff could presuma-
bly demonstrate "less intrusive alternatives" to invalidate a rent con-
trol. The United States Supreme Court has not sufficiently addressed
the section 2 "monopolization" offense 84 which, applying traditional
antitrust liability rules, appears to be viable.85
81. Id. at 1054. In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed to Rice v. Norman Wil-
liams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982), and to California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Justice Brennan stated that there was nothing in
Rice that supported such a narrow view of preemption. "Rice held that a 'state statute is
not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have
an anticompetitive effect.'" Id. at 1054 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Rice, a Califor-
nia statute effectively allowed liquor distillers to control the distribution of their products.
Justice Because it involved a nonprice restraint, which is not illegal per se, the statute
was not preempted. Justice Brennan pointed out that the Berkeley rent control ordinance
is illegal per se because it is a price restraint.
In Midcal, a California statute effectively required a wine wholesaler to sell at prices
set by producers. The Court held that the system was illegal price maintenance.
Justice Brennan also found Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384 (1951), to be directly on point. Paraphrasing the Court in Schwegmann, Justice
Brennan stated that "when [the city] compels [landlords] to follow a parallel price pol-
icy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids." Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at
1050 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1055. Justice Brennan stated that the majority apparently interpreted
the Sherman Act to forbid only privately arranged price fixing schemes as it flatly stated
that "[tihe ordinary relationship between the government and those who must obey its
regulatory commands whether they wish to or not is not enough to establish a conspir-
acy." Id. at 1050. According to Justice Brennan, to the contrary, Mideal and Schweg-
mann held that statutes which coerced parties to obey the law violated section 1. It
should be noted that these cases were characterized by the Fisher majority as "hybrid"
cases because private parties were largely responsible for setting prices.
83. Id. at 1050. Justice Brennan disagrees with the majority's apparent decision
because Congress has not enacted a broad antitrust exemption for municipalities.
84. Unlike a section I offense, a valid section 2 cause of action may involve unilat-
eral conduct. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 820 (1978).
85. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). For a section 2 cause of
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Neither decision is wholly satisfactory. The California Supreme
Court recognized that the traditional rules were fashioned for private
business. The analysis becomes blurred, however, when the court
created its own standard while simultaneously claiming to be analyz-
ing the Ordinance under Sherman Act principles. Assuming the
Sherman Act were an appropriate vehicle for ordinance invalidation,
the United States Supreme Court correctly used the traditional
rules. Both courts reached the correct result in finding no Sherman
Act violation. 86 The most persuasive legal analysis for these results
emanates not from the majority's holdings, however, but from the
Fisher dissent by California Supreme Court Justice Lucas, who de-
clared it an impossible task to weigh the "apples" of social welfare
with the "oranges" of antitrust policy. Sherman Act "conflicts" are
inapplicable to rent control ordinances. Any ordinance or regulation
is clearly a restraint, but these are not the restraints Congress con-
templated when formulating the Sherman Act. .
Regulation, by its very nature, is anticompetitive. Furthermore,
antitrust law is guided by economic policy which assumes the actor
is a profit maximizer. Profit maximization is inapposite to municipal-
ities engaged in nonproprietary conduct and forecloses municipal an-
titrust action on that theory. An examination of the underlying in-
tent of the Sherman Act, the goals of the act, and basic consumer
welfare theory (upon which antitrust decisions should be made) will
demonstrate the incompatibility of Sherman Act analysis to rent
control issues.
THE SHERMAN ACT: AN INAPPROPRIATE DEVICE FOR
INVALIDATING LOCAL RENT CONTROLS
The Sherman Act is an inappropriate device for invalidating local
rent controls because cities typically act for the benefit of the general
public. 7 Municipalities are not profit seekers making decisions based
action, a plaintiff would need to demonstrate that a city has a substantial market share.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
86. The United States Supreme Court's result was based on the finding of "no
conflict" between the ordinance and the Sherman Act. The Court, however, has created
what is, in essence, an antitrust exemption for municipalities. There is law to the con-
trary which indicates that government coercion of private parties may violate section 1.
See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
87. The City of Berkeley could have selfish interests since the city does own some
rentals in Berkeley which are exempt from the controls. Because 23,000 out of 27,000
rentals are controlled, it is likely, however, that the city would have little to gain as its
market share is insubstantial. If the city is a market participant in the regulated market
and if it has a substantial degree of market power in the relevant market, it could be
on a profit maximization goal. These types of Sherman Act lawsuits
represent a waste of resources and may discourage local governments
from making good decisions, although as Chief Justice Burger
pointed out in Lafayette, a municipality competing directly with pri-
vate entities for profit should be subject to the legal rules governing
an ordinary dispute between competitors."" In Lafayette, the cities
owned and operated utility companies which competed with a private
power company. Traditional municipal regulation, including rent
control, is clearly distinguishable. Neither Sherman Act goals nor
underlying antitrust theories support antitrust scrutiny of local rent
control ordinances.
Many legislative goals were considered when the Sherman Act
was passed in 1890.89 The courts have considered noneconomic val-
ues in the determination of antitrust cases.9 0 Nevertheless, economic
objectives have been paramount in the majority of cases.,' Judge
Bork92 has concluded that the only legitimate goal of the antitrust
laws is the maximization of consumer welfare. No other values
should be considered."' Consumer welfare is maximized when soci-
ety's economic resources are allocated so that consumer wants are
satisfied. 94 The procompetitive 5 policies of the antitrust laws in-
presumed that the city is acting in its own interest, that is, as a profit maximizer. Absent
any significant degree of power it should be assumed that the city is acting for the benefit
of the general public.
88. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 418.
89. See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 84, §§ 103-113; 1 E.
KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 4.1-4.18 (1980).
90. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (discussing
a producer, rather than consumer, welfare goal; that is, the court permitted price fixingamong economically distressed coal producers enabling greater profits than were other-
wise possible absent the cartel); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918)(balancing of consumer welfare with the welfare of small businesses); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) ("We
have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monopoly; but . . . thereare others, based upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently unde-
sirable, regardless of their economic results . . . . [A]mong the purposes of Congress in1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of.capital because of the helpless-
ness of the individual before them.").
91. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); see
also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 84, § 104; Bork, Legislative Intent and the
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & EcON. 7 (1966).
92. Judge Bork is recognized for his achievements as a scholar, in government ser-
vice, and on the bench, and has recently spoken on the confluence of economic rights and
the Constitution. See, e.g., Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic
Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986).
93. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (1978).
94. Id. at 90.
95. Id. at 51. Judge Bork defines competition as "any state of affairs in which
consumer welfare cannot be increased by judicial decree." Id.
There may be situations where the market fails and cannot reach the optimal outcome.
For example, an economic activity may create social costs. The typical example is pollu-
tion. The firm may not internalize all of its costs of production and an externality prob-
lem results which may only be corrected with the aid of legislation.
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crease the wealth of the nation by driving resources to their most
highly valued uses.9 6
If consumer welfare is the only legitimate goal of the antitrust
laws and consumer welfare is maximized through competitive forces,
then cursory analysis indicates that a local rent control ordinance
inherently conflicts with the procompetitive policies of the Sherman
Act. Further inquiry exposes the fallacy of this conclusion. As Jus-
tice Lucas reasoned, comparing the competing values of competition
and public welfare is like comparing apples with oranges. The sole
goal of the Sherman Act, when addressing either private anticompe-
titive offenses or public offenses when the city acts as a profit maxi-
mizer, is consumer welfare.
CONCLUSION
Competition cannot always satisfy other social objectives. Direct
legislation is a more effective method of promoting such goals.
97
When a municipality is acting in a nonproprietary role, courts should
not become enmeshed in a tortured application of antitrust principles
to social and public welfare values. Economic price theory must be
employed to make rational antitrust decisions, but price theory does
not consider values other than consumer welfare. Further, the pri-
mary assumption underlying the theory is that the actor is a profit
maximizer.98 Local governments acting in a nonproprietary manner
are not acting as profit maximizers. Price theory, therefore, is virtu-
ally useless in these situations and there is no rational basis for an
antitrust decision. Municipal rent control ordinances are clearly
outside the scope of Sherman Act antitrust analysis.
ROBIN M. BERNHARDT
96. Id. at 91. Competition drives resources into their most efficient uses. Effi-
ciency can be broken down into (1) allocative efficiency (the placement of resources in
the community) and (2) productive efficiency (the effective use of resources by the firm).
These two types of efficiency determine the nation's wealth or consumer welfare. Anti-
trust laws should improve allocative efficiency so much as to produce either no loss or a
net gain in consumer welfare.
97. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 84, § 105.
98. See R. BORK, supra note 93, at 116.
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